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Abstract. We study the diﬀerences of Martin-Löf random left-c.e. reals and show that for each pair of such
reals α, β there exists a unique number r > 0 such that qα − β is a Martin-Löf random left-c.e. real for each
positive rational q > r and a Martin-Löf random right-c.e. real for each positive rational q < r. Based on
this result we develop a theory of diﬀerences of halting probabilities, which answers a number of questions
about Martin-Löf random left-c.e. reals, including one of the few remaining open problems from the list
of open questions in algorithmic randomness [MN06]. The halting probability of a preﬁx-free machine M
restricted to a set X is the probability that the machine halts and outputs an element of X. Becher, Figueira,
Grigorieﬀ, and Miller asked whether ΩU(X) is Martin-Löf random when U is universal and X is a Π01 set.
We apply our theory of diﬀerences of halting probabilities to give a positive answer.
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1 Introduction
Perhaps the most recognizable algorithmically random number is Chaitin’s Ω number. This is the proba-
bility that a universal preﬁx-free machine U halts when we feed the input with successive bits (zeros and
ones) until a computation converges, and is usually denoted by ΩU . The fact that the underlying machine
has a preﬁx-free domain allows for this number to be deﬁned with the following rather simple formula:
ΩU =
∑
U(σ)↓
2−|σ|. (1)
Preﬁx-free machines are Turing machines whose domain is a preﬁx-free subset of the ﬁnite binary strings,
so that they operate instantaneous codes (i.e. uniquely decodable without out-of-band markers). Such
machines are essentially equivalent to self-delimiting machines, i.e. Turing machines with a one-way input
and one-way output tape, such that a convergent computation on a ﬁnite binary input σ cannot be extended
to a diﬀerent computation on an input which extends σ. Chaitin [Cha75] used these machines in order to
give a deﬁnition of randomness for inﬁnite sequences in terms of incompressibility, and showed that for
each universal preﬁx-free machine U the number ΩU is algorithmically random, in the sense that its binary
expansion is a random sequence according to the deﬁnition of Martin-Löf [ML66]. The probability that U
halts and outputs a string in a set X of binary strings is:
ΩU(X) =
∑
U(σ)↓∈X
2−|σ|. (2)
Chaitin [Cha04] observed that if X is a computably enumerable set, then ΩU(X) is Martin-Löf random.
The question as to whether there is a set X such that its complement is computably enumerable (i.e. X is
a Π01 set) and ΩU(X) is not Martin-Löf random was asked and discussed by a number of authors [BG05,
BFGM06, FSW06], occasionally along with partial solutions. It is also one of the last remaining problems
(Question 8.10) in the list of open problems in algorithmic randomness by Miller and Nies [MN06]. There
is a considerable background and an original motivation surrounding this question of restricted halting
probability, which we defer to Section 1.3 in order to focus on our present contribution.
Problem 1.1 (Question 8.10 in Miller and Nies [MN06]). If U is a universal machine and X  ∅ is a Π01
set, is the probability ΩU(X) always a Martin-Löf random number?
This open problem was the starting point for our investigations, which led to the study of more general
questions concerning the diﬀerences of Ω numbers, and revealed a missing theory which is complementary
to the well developed theory of halting probabilities (see Downey and Hirschfeldt [DH10, Chapter 9] for
an overview). Before we present our solution and, perhaps more interestingly, the intriguing theory of
diﬀerences of halting probabilities that it inspired, we make our discussion precise by giving a formal
deﬁnition of universality. Informally, a Turing machine is universal if it can simulate any other Turing
machine.
Deﬁnition 1.2 (Universal preﬁx-free machines). Given an eﬀective list (Me) of all preﬁx-free machines, a
preﬁx-free machine U is universal if there exists a computable function e → σe such that, for all τ ∈ 2<ω,
U(σe ∗ τ)  Me(τ).
As usual, the symbol  denotes that either both sides of the relation are deﬁned and equal, or both sides
are undeﬁned. In Kolmogorov complexity theory, universal machines are sometimes called universal by
adjunction in order to distinguish them from a wider class of machines, the optimal preﬁx-free machines.
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The latter class consists of the preﬁx-free machines with respect to which the Kolmogorov complexity
function is minimal modulo an additive constant, within the class of all preﬁx-free machines. In their
attempt at Problem 1.1, Figueira, Stephan, and Wu [FSW06] constructed a special optimal preﬁx-free
machine U and a Π01 set X such that ΩU(X) is not Martin-Löf random. However their machine is not
universal and, as will become clear in the following, this approach has little to do with a solution to the
problem. Becher, Figueira, Grigorieﬀ, and Miller showed in [BG05] that, given a universal preﬁx-free
machine U, there is a Δ02 set X such that ΩU(X) is not Martin-Löf random.
1.1 Solution to the problem of restricted halting probability
Despite these negative results, we give a rather surprising positive answer to Problem 1.1. Recall that a
real is left-c.e. if it has a computably enumerable (in short, c.e.) left Dedekind cut or, equivalently, if it is
the limit of a computable increasing sequence of rationals. Moreover we point out that left-c.e. reals can
be seen as halting probabilities of preﬁx-free machines, if one considers the Kraft-Chaitin algorithm for
constructing preﬁx-free machines (see e.g. [DH10, Section 2.6]). Conversely, every halting probability of
a preﬁx-free machine is a left-c.e. real, so the two classes of reals coincide.
Theorem 1.3. If U is a universal preﬁx-free machine and X is a nonempty Π01 set, the number ΩU(X) is a
Martin-Löf random left-c.e. real.
Let us illustrate the novelty of this result with an example. Given a Σ01 set X, there is a machine which
enumerates X, and since the convergent computations of a preﬁx-free machine U are also computably
enumerable, it is not surprising thatΩU(X) has a computably enumerable Dedekind cut. As the enumeration
of X progresses, more programs halt on elements of X, and the probability of this happening according to
(2) can be approximated by a computable increasing sequence of rationals. If, however, X is a Π01 set,
such as the non-theorems of Peano arithmetic, there is no apparent way to approximate ΩU(X) without
overestimating its value. Indeed, a correct approximation would have to account for the programs that
converge to the non-theorems of Peano arithmetic. As one enumerates the theorems of Peano arithmetic,
the non-computability of this set means that there is no way in general to be sure that a given statement will
not be enumerated at a later stage, at which point any previous consideration of programs converging to
that statement will have introduced a possible overestimation of ΩU(X). Despite this, not only does there
exist a way to approximate ΩU(X) without ever overestimating it, but any computable approximation to it
essentially already has this property:
Given any universal preﬁx-free machine U, any Π01 set X  ∅ and any computable sequence
of rationals (αs) converging to ΩU(X) we have αs < ΩU(X) for all but ﬁnitely many s.
(3)
This fact will be derived from Theorem 1.3 and the properties of Martin-Löf random left-c.e. reals. So what
does Problem 1.1 have to do with diﬀerences of halting probabilities? It is not hard to see thatΩU(X) can be
written as ΩU −ΩU(X), where X denotes the complement of X. Moreover if X is Π01 then X is c.e. so ΩU(X)
is a Martin-Löf random left-c.e. real. By central results from the theory of Martin-Löf random left-c.e.
reals (see Section 1.2), Martin-Löf random left-c.e. reals are exactly the halting probabilities of universal
preﬁx-free machines. Therefore there exists a universal preﬁx-free machine V such that ΩV = ΩU(X) and
hence, ΩU(X) is the diﬀerence ΩU − ΩV of two halting probabilities of universal preﬁx-free machines. So
the question as to whether ΩU(X) is Martin-Löf random has much to do with what happens if we subtract
two Martin-Löf random left-c.e. reals.
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Reals that are diﬀerences of left-c.e. reals (i.e. of the form α−β for α, β left-c.e.) are often called d.c.e. reals.
There has been considerable work on this class of reals [ASWZ00, Rai05, Ng06, DWZ04, DWZ04]. More-
over the theory of Martin-Löf random left-c.e. reals is well understood, initially with [Sol75, CHKW01,
KS01] and on a deeper level with [DHN02]. Despite this considerable body of work, the basic question as
to what happens when we subtract two Martin-Löf random left-c.e. reals has remained largely untouched.
It turns out that the solution of Problem 1.1 crucially depends on the answer to this question, which we
present in the next section.
1.2 A theory of diﬀerences of universal halting probabilities
The d.c.e. reals form a ﬁeld under the usual addition and multiplication, as was demonstrated by Ambos-
Spies, Weihrauch, and Zheng [ASWZ00]. Raichev [Rai05] and Ng [Ng06] showed that this ﬁeld is real-
closed. Downey, Wu and Zheng [DWZ04] studied the Turing degrees of d.c.e. reals. Clearly d.c.e. reals
are Δ02 since they can be computably approximated. Downey, Wu and Zheng [DWZ04] showed that every
real which is truth-table reducible to the halting problem is Turing equivalent to a d.c.e. real. However they
also showed that there are Δ02 degrees which do not contain any d.c.e. reals. In this strong sense, d.c.e. reals
form a strict subclass of the Δ02 reals.
Deﬁnition 1.4 (Approximations). A left-c.e. approximation to a real α is a computable sequence of ratio-
nals (αs) which converges to α and such that αs ≤ α for almost all s. A d.c.e. approximation is a sequence
of the form (αs − βs) where (αs) and (βs) are bounded increasing sequences of rationals.
A real is called right-c.e. if its right Dedekind cut is c.e. or, equivalently, if it is the limit of a decreasing
computable sequence of rationals. A right-c.e. approximation is deﬁned similarly to a left-c.e. approxima-
tion but with the inequality reversed. For example, a d.c.e. approximation (αs −βs) to α−β is left-c.e. if for
almost all s we have αs − βs < α − β, and is right-c.e. if for almost all s we have αs − βs > α − β. A real is
called properly d.c.e. if it is d.c.e. and is neither a left-c.e. nor a right-c.e. real. Rettinger and Zheng [RZ05]
(also see [DH10, Theorem 9.2.4 ]) proved that there are no properly d.c.e. Martin-Löf random reals.
Every Martin-Löf random d.c.e. real is a left-c.e. or a right-c.e. real. In fact, any d.c.e.
approximation to a Martin-Löf random real is either left-c.e. or right-c.e. (4)
An initial reaction to this result might be that there is not much to say about d.c.e. reals and Martin-
Löf randomness. This impression quickly fades, however, once rather basic questions are asked regarding
diﬀerences of Martin-Löf random left-c.e. reals, which cannot be answered by the existing theory of Martin-
Löf random left-c.e. reals. Problem 1.1 is such a question, and is part of the more general question as to what
properties the diﬀerences of Martin-Löf random left-c.e. reals have. The latter question becomes even more
interesting once we recall the maximality properties of Martin-Löf random left-c.e. reals inside the class
of left-c.e. reals, which were established largely on the basis of the cumulative work of Solovay [Sol75],
Calude, Hertling, Khoussainov and Wang [CHKW01] and Kucˇera and Slaman [KS01], showing that the
Martin-Löf random left-c.e. reals are exactly the halting probabilities of universal preﬁx-free machines.
Downey, Hirschfeldt and Nies [DHN02] proved that given any two Martin-Löf random left-c.e. reals α, β,
if q is a suﬃciently large positive rational number then qα−β is a Martin-Löf random left-c.e. real. Similarly,
if q is a suﬃciently small positive rational number then qα − β is a Martin-Löf random right-c.e. real. This
result demonstrates the universality of Martin-Löf random left-c.e. reals, in the sense that they can ‘absorb’
any other left-c.e. real which is appropriately scaled. In other words, they remain left-c.e. and Martin-Löf
random even when we subtract a left-c.e. real from them, provided that the latter is appropriately scaled.
4
But what happens in-between these appropriate values of q? Is there a non-trivial interval of rationals q
such that qα − β is neither a left-c.e. nor a right-c.e. real, and hence not a Martin-Löf random real? Given
two left-c.e. reals α, β deﬁne:
D(α, β) = inf
{
q ∈ Q+ | qα − β is a left-c.e. real
}
(5)
D∗(α, β) = sup
{
q ∈ Q+ | qα − β is a right-c.e. real
}
. (6)
As we discussed above, if α, β are Martin-Löf random then both D(α, β) and D∗(α, β) are positive and
ﬁnite. Moreover qα − β is a left-c.e. real for each rational q > D(α, β) and a right-c.e. real for each positive
rational q < D∗(α, β).
Theorem 1.5. Given any Martin-Löf random left-c.e. reals α, β, we haveD(α, β) = D∗(α, β).
This is remarkable! As q ranges from 0 to inﬁnity, there is a unique point where qα− β undergoes a sudden
transition from being a left-c.e. real to being a right-c.e. real (note that this point of transition will not
generally be β/α sinceD(α, β) andD∗(α, β) are unaﬀected by the addition or subtraction of rational values
to α and β, so that D(α, β) = D(α + 12 , β), for example). Moreover, as will become clear in the following,
qα − β remains Martin-Löf random either side of the transition point, but loses its randomness precisely at
the point of transition. We can use this result in order to get a complete answer to the question concerning
diﬀerences of Martin-Löf random left-c.e. reals.
Theorem 1.6. Let α, β be Martin-Löf random left-c.e. reals. Then
(a) ifD(α, β) < 1 then α − β is a Martin-Löf random left-c.e. real;
(b) ifD(α, β) = 1 then α − β is not Martin-Löf random;
(c) ifD(α, β) > 1 then α − β is a Martin-Löf random right-c.e. real.
The proof of Theorem 1.5 actually gives another remarkable new result regarding the approximations to
Martin-Löf random left-c.e. reals. Given any two Martin-Löf random left-c.e. reals α, β and any monotone
left-c.e. computable approximations (αs), (βs) converging to α and β respectively, the ratio of the rates of
convergence has a unique limit, namelyD(α, β) > 0.
Theorem 1.7. Let α, β be Martin-Löf random left-c.e. reals and let (αs), (βs) be any monotone left-c.e.
computable approximations to α and β respectively. Then:
lim
s
(
α − αs
β − βs
)
exists and is equal toD(α, β).
In interpreting this theorem, note thatD(α, β) depends only on α and β, and is independent of the particular
choice for (αs), (βs). Finally, we note that if α, β, γ are Martin-Löf random left-c.e. reals and q is a positive
rational then:
(1) D(α + β, γ) = D(α, γ) +D(β, γ)
(2) D(α, q · β) = 1/q · D(α, β) andD(q · α, β) = q · D(α, β).
(3) D(α, β) · D(β, α) = 1.
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These linearity properties of the operatorD are a direct consequence of Theorem 1.7.
Miller [Mil17] gives a beautiful account of the results of this section, along with alternative proofs and
extensions to the d.c.e. reals.
1.3 Background
Some familiarity with the basic concepts of algorithmic information theory and the basic methods of com-
putability theory would be helpful for the reader. For such background we refer to one of the monographs
[LV97, DH10, Nie09], where the latter two are more focused on computability theory aspects of algorith-
mic randomness. In this section we lay out some preliminary material which is directly relevant to the
present work and which we avoided in the introduction for the sake of clarity of presentation. We start
with a brief discussion of some facts from the theory of left-c.e. reals. The results we mention in Section
1.3.1 are directly relevant to our work, and will be used throughout our analysis. We continue with some
deﬁnitions of algorithmic randomness in Section 1.3.2. We deﬁne Martin-Löf randomness in two equiva-
lent ways, namely in terms of Martin-Löf tests and in terms of Solovay tests. Both of these notions will be
used in our analysis; the argument of Section 4 uses a Martin-Löf test while Section 3 uses a Solovay test.
Finally in Section 1.3.3 we include a brief discussion of the original motivation behind Problem 1.1, which
we omitted in the introduction.
1.3.1 Completeness in the Solovay degrees of left-c.e. reals
Solovay [Sol75] deﬁned a reducibility on the left-c.e. reals as a measure of the hardness of approximation.
Given left-c.e. reals α, β we say that α is Solovay reducible to β if there exists a partial computable function
ϕ and a constant c such that for all rationals q < β, ϕ(q) is deﬁned and 0 ≤ α−ϕ(q) ≤ c·(β−q). This condition
is equivalent to requiring that there are left-c.e. monotone approximations (αs), (βs) to α, β respectively and
a constant c such that α − αs ≤ c · (β − βs) for all s. Downey, Hirschfeldt and Nies [DHN02] showed that
α is Solovay reducible to β if and only if there exists a left-c.e. real γ and a rational constant c such that
β = c ·α+γ. In the same paper it was shown that α is Solovay reducible to β if and only if there are left-c.e.
monotone approximations (αs), (βs) to α, β respectively and a constant c such that αs+1−αs < c · (βs+1−βs)
for all s. Solovay’s work, combined with the work of Calude, Hertling, Khoussainov and Wang [CHKW01]
and Kucˇera and Slaman [KS01], showed that the Martin-Löf random left-c.e. reals are exactly the complete
left-c.e. reals with respect to Solovay reducibility. Moreover, this work also implies that the Martin-Löf
random left-c.e. reals are exactly the halting probabilities of universal preﬁx-free machines.
More speciﬁcally, Calude, Hertling, Khoussainov and Wang [CHKW01] showed that if α, β are left-c.e.
reals, α is Martin-Löf random and is Solovay reducible to β then β is Martin-Löf random. Kucˇera and
Slaman showed that every Martin-Löf random left-c.e. real is complete with respect to Solovay reducibility.
Downey, Hirschfeldt and Nies [DHN02] also showed that addition is a join operation in the Solovay degrees
and that the Martin-Löf random left-c.e. reals are join-irreducible. In other words, if α is a Martin-Löf
random left-c.e. real and β is another left-c.e. real then α+β is a Martin-Löf random left-c.e. real; conversely,
if α, β are left-c.e. reals and α + β is Martin-Löf random, then at least one of α, β is Martin-Löf random.
The ﬁrst of these results had already been proved in Demuth [Dem75].
The starting point of the present work was to consider the size of the constant c in Solovay reductions.
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In particular, any two Martin-Löf random left-c.e. reals are Solovay equivalent, but how small can the
constants in the associated reductions be? If one examines the proofs in the work mentioned above, one
ﬁnds that the inﬁmum of the constants c that are possible in a reduction between two left-c.e. reals α, β, is
the same for all of the above characterisations of Solovay reducibility. This observation indicated that this
inﬁmum is a robust characteristic of the pair α, β – a fact that we eventually proved with Theorem 1.5 and
Theorem 1.7.
1.3.2 Martin-Löf and Solovay tests for randomness
Algorithmic randomness for real numbers was originally deﬁned by Martin-Löf in [ML66] in terms of
eﬀective statistical tests. A Martin-Löf test is a uniformly c.e. sequence of Σ01 classes of reals (Ui) such that
the Lebesgue measure of Ui is bounded by 2−i. In other words, a Martin-Löf test is a uniform sequence of
eﬀectively open sets of reals whose measure decreases uniformly. Eﬀectively open sets of reals are often
represented as c.e. sets of ﬁnite strings, while ﬁnite strings in turn can be viewed as basic open sets in the
Cantor space (a string σ represents the set of reals with preﬁx σ). A point on the real line can be regarded as
a member of the Cantor space (consisting of the inﬁnite binary sequences) by identifying it with its binary
expansion. We say that a real α is Martin-Löf random if α  ∩iUi for all Martin-Löf tests (Ui).
Solovay [Sol75] devised an equivalent way to test Martin-Löf randomness. A Solovay test is a uniformly
c.e. sequence of Σ01 classes I j such that the sum of the measures μ(I j) (summing over all j ∈ N) is ﬁnite.
Solovay showed that a real α is Martin-Löf random if and only if, for every Solovay test (I j) there are only
ﬁnitely many j with α ∈ I j.
1.3.3 Historical context of the Problem 1.1
Some researchers have been looking to obtain other algorithmically random numbers, perhaps more ran-
dom than the halting probability, through an examination of the stochastic behavior of a Turing machine.
Here the stochasticity refers to some form of probability measure on the space of inputs, which can be seen
as the outcomes of an experiment, like a repeated coin-toss. The strength of algorithmic randomness can
be calibrated through the various recursion-theoretic hierarchies. The standard notion of algorithmic ran-
domness is Martin-Löf randomness, also called 1-randomness, which can be relativized to the nth iteration
of the halting problem, giving n-randomness. Becher and Chaitin [BDC01] considered a preﬁx-free model
for inﬁnite computations, which was introduced by Chaitin in [Cha76] and whose study was suggested
in [Cha01, Chapter 6]. They showed that the probability that a universal preﬁx-free machine for inﬁnite
computations outputs ﬁnitely many symbols is 2-random.
According to [BFGM06], in 2002 Grigorieﬀ suggested the study of the halting probability of a preﬁx-free
machine restricted to a set X of outputs. He considered the number (2), which is the probability that a
standard universal preﬁx-free machine U halts with output a member of the set X. He conjectured that the
higher the arithmetical complexity of X is, the more random the number ΩU(X) becomes. If this were true,
then this would be a neat way to obtain highly random numbers as halting probabilities in the standard
preﬁx-free model for computation. Versions of of this conjecture were successfully pursued for Chaitin’s
inﬁnite computation model of [Cha76], by Becher and Grigorieﬀ in [BG05, BG09]. However, as far as the
usual preﬁx-free machines are concerned, the conjecture proved largely false after Miller in 2004 produced
a Δ02 set X such that ΩU(X) is a rational number (see [BG05] for the announcement of this result and
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[BFGM06] for a proof). Becher, Figueira, Grigorieﬀ, and Miller [BFGM06] continued with a large number
of negative results, showing that ΩU(X) is often less random than expected, given the complexity of X. In
this same paper there is also a positive result, showing that ΩU(X) is 1-random when X is Σ0n-complete or
Π0n-complete for some n > 1. Nevertheless, they also show that for each n > 1 the number ΩU(X) is not
n-random for any Σ0n or Π
0
n set X. On a positive note, Chaitin [Cha04] had already noticed that if X is a Σ
0
1
set, then ΩU(X) is Martin-Löf random. The case when X is Π01 is the basis of Problem 1.1 and has remained
open. Figueira, Stephan, and Wu [FSW06] constructed an optimal (in terms of Kolmogorov complexity)
but not universal preﬁx-free machine U and a Π01 set X such that ΩU(X) is not Martin-Löf random. They
also suggested some strategies for giving a negative answer to Problem 1.1. In the present work, we see
that Problem 1.1 has a surprising positive answer.
2 Overview
In this section we reduce all of the results in this paper to two technical lemmas, which we prove in Sections
3 and 4 respectively. This style of presentation should make the content of this work readily accessible.
In Section 2.1 we derive the results of Section 1.2 from Lemma 2.1, whose proof is a delicate technical
argument which is deﬀerred to Section 3. Then in Section 2.3 we give the solution of Problem 1.1, using
the results of Section 1.2 and Lemma 2.2. The proof latter lemma is a decanter argument, which has
some things in common with the original decanter argument by Downey, Hirschfeldt, Nies and Stephan
[DHNS03] and is given in Section 4.
2.1 Proof of Theorem 1.5 and Theorem 1.7
Downey, Hirschfeldt and Nies [DHN02] showed that, given any two left-c.e. reals α, β, the numberD(α, β)
is the limit inﬁmum of (α − αs)/(β − βs) with respect to all left-c.e. increasing approximations (αs), (βs)
to α, β respectively. Hence for Theorem 1.7 it suﬃces to show that in the case where α, β are Martin-Löf
random, given left-c.e. increasing approximations (αs), (βs) to α, β respectively, the limit of (α−αs)/(β−βs)
exists. By the density of the rationals in the real line, this statement follows from the following special case,
which is proved in Section 3.
Lemma 2.1. Suppose α and β are c.e. reals, that α is Martin-Löf random and that p ∈ Q with p >
1. Suppose given left-c.e. approximations (αs) and (βs) to α and β respectively. Then the following two
conditions cannot both hold:
1. There exist inﬁnitely many s with p(α − αs) < (β − βs);
2. There exist inﬁnitely many s with (β − βs) < (α − αs).
Next, we show how to derive Theorem 1.5 from Lemma 2.1. Suppose that α and β are c.e. reals and that α
is Martin-Löf random. In order to establish Theorem 1.5, it suﬃces to show that if p, q ∈ Q+ with p > q,
then either pα − β is left-c.e. or else qα − β is a right-c.e. real.1 In fact it suﬃces to establish this for the
case q = 1. Then, for general p > q in Q+, if qα − β is not right c.e., neither is α − (β/q), which means that
1Indeed, if Theorem 1.5 did not hold, thenD(α, β) > D∗(α, β). If we take q < p betweenD∗(α, β) andD(α, β) then we would
have that pα − β is not left-c.e. and qα − β is not a right-c.e. real.
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(p/q)α− (β/q) and thus pα− β must be a left-c.e. real. So to prove 1.5, it suﬃces to establish the following
fact.
If α and β are c.e. reals and α is Martin-Löf random, then for p ∈ Qwith p > 1,
either pα − β is left-c.e., or else α − β is a right-c.e. real. (7)
Now we show how to obtain (7) from Lemma 2.1. Consider left-c.e. approximations (αs) and (βs) to α and
β such that α is Martin-Löf random. There are then two cases to consider.
Case 1. There do not exist inﬁnitely many s with p(α− αs) < (β− βs). If there exists an s with p(α− αs) =
(β−βs) then pα−β is rational and so is clearly a left-c.e. real. Otherwise, we can ﬁnd s0 such that p(α−αs) >
(β − βs) for all s ≥ s0. In order to deﬁne a left-c.e. approximation (γs) to pα − β, deﬁne γ0 = pαs0 − βs0 .
Given γi and si (such that p(α − αsi) > (β − βsi)), ﬁnd si+1 > si such that p(αsi+1 − αsi) > (βsi+1 − βsi), and
deﬁne γi+1 = pαsi+1 − βsi+1 .
Case 2. There do exist inﬁnitely many s with p(α−αs) < (β−βs). In this case Lemma 2.1 tells us that there
cannot exist inﬁnitely many s with (β − βs) < (α − αs). If there exists an s with (β − βs) = (α − αs) then
α − β is rational and so is a right-c.e. real. Otherwise, let s0 be such that (α − αs) < (β − βs) for all s ≥ s0.
In order to deﬁne a right c.e. approximation (δs) to α − β, deﬁne δ0 = αs0 − βs0 . Given δi and si (such that
(α − αsi) < (β − βsi)), ﬁnd si+1 > si such that (αsi+1 − αsi) < (βsi+1 − βsi), and deﬁne δi+1 = αsi+1 − βsi+1 .
We have reduced Theorem 1.5 and Theorem 1.7 to Lemma 2.1, whose proof is given in Section 3.
2.2 Proof of Theorem 1.6
For clause (a) suppose that D(α, β) < 1. Then there exists a rational number q < 1 such that qα − β is
a left-c.e. real. Recall that Demuth [Dem75] showed that the sum of a Martin-Löf random left-c.e. real
and any other left-c.e. real is Martin-Löf random. Therefore α − β is Martin-Löf random as the sum of the
Martin-Löf random left-c.e. real (1 − q)α and the left-c.e. real qα − β.
For clause (c) the argument is similar. If D(α, β) > 1 then by Theorem 1.5 we have D∗(α, β) > 1. So
there exists p > 1 such that pα − β is a right-c.e. real. Recall that Demuth [Dem75] showed that the sum
of a Martin-Löf random right-c.e. real and any other right-c.e. real is Martin-Löf random. Hence α − β is
a Martin-Löf random right-c.e. real as the sum of the Martin-Löf random right-c.e. real (1 − p)α and the
right-c.e. real pα − β.
For clause (b), it suﬃces to prove the contrapositive. So assume that α − β is Martin-Löf random. Then by
(4), α − β is either a left-c.e. real or a right-c.e. real. Without loss of generality, assume that it is a Martin-
Löf random left-c.e. real. Then by Downey, Hirschfeldt and Nies [DHN02] there exists a suﬃciently small
but positive rational q such that (α − β) − qα is a Martin-Löf random left-c.e. real. But this means that
D(α, β) ≤ 1 − q so D(α, β) < 1. In the case where α − β is a Martin-Löf random right-c.e. real, a similar
argument gives thatD(α, β) > 1. In any case,D(α, β)  1, which concludes the proof.
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2.3 Proof of Theorem 1.3
Let us brieﬂy note that (3) is a direct consequence of Theorem 1.3 and (4).2 We are going to reduce Theorem
1.3 to the following two lemmas, of which the ﬁrst one has a self-contained proof presented in Section 4,
and the latter one is based on the results of Section 1.2.
Lemma 2.2. If X is a Π01 set and ΩU(X) is a right-c.e. real then ΩU(X) is not Martin-Löf random.
The following lemma can be proved using Theorem 1.6, and is of independent interest.
Lemma 2.3. If δ is a d.c.e. real which is not Martin-Löf random and α is a Martin-Löf random left-c.e. real
then α + δ is a Martin-Löf random left-c.e. real.
Proof. Let δ = δ0−δ1. We can suppose that δ0 and δ1 are Martin-Löf random (otherwise add a random left-
c.e. real to both). Since δ is not Martin-Löf random we have D(δ0, δ1) = 1, by Theorem 1.6. Since α is a
Martin-Löf random left-c.e. real, by Downey, Hirschfeldt and Nies [DHN02] (see the discussion in Section
1.3.1) there exists some c and another left-c.e. real β such that α = 2−c ·δ0+β. So α+δ = β+(1+2−c)·δ0−δ1.
But sinceD(δ0, δ1) = 1 the real (1 + 2−c) · δ0 − δ1 is left-c.e. and Martin-Löf random (again by [DHN02]).
So α + δ is also left-c.e. and Martin-Löf random, which completes the proof. 
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.3, using Lemma 2.2 and Lemma 2.3. Let x ∈ X and consider
Y = X − {x} which is a Π01 set. Then ΩU(X) = ΩU(Y)+ΩU({x}). Note that ΩU({x}) is a Martin-Löf random
left-c.e. real. By Lemma 2.2 the number ΩU(Y) is one of the following:
(a) a right-c.e. real which is not Martin-Löf random;
(b) a proper d.c.e. real (hence, by (4), not Martin-Löf random);
(c) a left-c.e. real.
In the ﬁrst two cases ΩU(Y) is a d.c.e. real which is not Martin-Löf random, so by Lemma 2.3 and the fact
that ΩU({x}) is a Martin-Löf random left-c.e. real we have that ΩU(X) is a Martin-Löf random left-c.e. real.
In the last case ΩU(Y) is a left-c.e. real so ΩU(X) is again a Martin-Löf random left-c.e. real as the sum of
a left-c.e. real and a random left-c.e. real, which concludes the proof.
3 Proof of Lemma 2.1
Towards a contradiction, suppose that α, β, p, (αs) and (βs) are as in the statement of the Lemma 2.1, and
that conditions (1) and (2) both hold. We shall show how to enumerate a Solovay test establishing that
(p − 1)α is not random. It will be convenient to make use of the following notation.
Deﬁnition 3.1. For any given s > 0, let α∗s = αs − αs−1. For s1 ≥ s0 deﬁne α∗s0,s1 = αs1 − αs0 , and
α∗s0,∞ = α − αs0 . Also deﬁne β∗s, β∗s0,s1 and β∗s0,∞ similarly.
2If (3) did not hold, then either there are inﬁnitely many terms of the sequence (αs) on both sides of ΩU (X), or almost all terms
are larger than ΩU (X). In the ﬁrst case, by (4) we get that ΩU (X) is not Martin-Löf random, which contradicts Theorem 1.3. In the
second case we get that ΩU (X) is right-c.e. and since by Theorem 1.3 it is also left-c.e. it has to be computable. But then again this
contradicts Theorem 1.3.
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From the fact that condition (1) holds, we can actually deduce that there exist inﬁnitely many s for which a
stronger condition holds:
(∗1) For all s′ > s, pα∗s,s′ < β∗s,s′ .
In order to see this, let s0 be such that pα∗s0,∞ < β
∗
s0,∞. If (∗1) holds for s0 then we have found a stage≥ s0 which satisﬁes (∗1). Otherwise, let s ≥ s0 be minimal such that, for all s′ > s, pα∗s0,s′ < β∗s0,s′ . This
means that pα∗s0,s ≥ β∗s0,s. If s′ > s and pα∗s,s′ ≥ β∗s,s′ , then pα∗s0,s′ = p(α∗s0,s + α∗s,s′) ≥ β∗s0,s + β∗s,s′ = β∗s0,s′ ,
a contradiction. So s is a stage ≥ s0 which satisﬁes (∗1). In each case, we can conclude that there exists a
stage ≥ s0 which satisﬁes (∗1).
From (2) we can similarly deduce that there are inﬁnitely many s for which the following stronger condition
holds:
(∗2) For all s′ > s, β∗s,s′ < α∗s,s′ .
In order to see this, let s0 be such that β∗s0,∞ < α
∗
s0,∞. If (∗2) holds for s0 then we have found a stage ≥ s0
which satisﬁes (∗2). Otherwise, let s ≥ s0 be minimal such that, for all s′ > s, β∗s0,s′ < α∗s0,s′ . This means
that β∗s0,s ≥ α∗s0,s. If s′ > s and β∗s,s′ ≥ α∗s,s′ , then α∗s0,s′ = α∗s0,s + α∗s,s′ ≤ β∗s0,s + β∗s,s′ = β∗s0,s′ , a contradiction.
So s is a stage ≥ s0 which satisﬁes (∗2). In each case, we can conclude that there exists a stage ≥ s0 which
satisﬁes (∗2).
Without loss of generality we may suppose that s = 0 is one of those stages for which (∗1) holds (otherwise
begin the enumeration at some later stage).
3.1 Proof idea
The key to the proof lies in the following basic observation. Suppose that s1 > 0 is the least stage for which
(∗2) holds. Let β1 = β∗0,s1 , β2 = β∗s1,∞ and α1 = α∗0,s1 , α2 = α∗s1,∞ (where 1 and 2 are used as indices rather
than to denote exponentiation). Then we have:
β1 + β2 > p(α1 + α2), β2 < α2, (8)
which gives,
β1 − α1 > (p − 1)(α1 + α2). (9)
In order to begin enumerating a Solovay test which will be failed by (p−1)α, (9) suggests that we could start
by enumerating intervals in the following fashion. Let a1 = (p−1)α0 and b1 = a1+ (β∗1−α∗1). At stage 1 we
enumerate the interval [a1, b1]. At later stages s, we could consider the last interval [ai, bi] enumerated, and
look to see whether a1 + (β∗0,s −α∗0,s) > bi. If so, then we could deﬁne ai+1 = bi, bi+1 = a1 + (β∗0,s −α∗0,s) and
enumerate this into our Solovay test. What happens if we proceed in this way? The ﬁrst thing to observe is
that, by the end of stage s1 (recall that (∗2) holds for s1), (9) ensures (p − 1)α meets at least one element of
the test enumerated thus far. What then happens after stage s1? The fact that s1 satisﬁes (∗2) means that at
every stage s > s1 we will ﬁnd that a1+ (β∗0,s−α∗0,s) = a1+ (β∗0,s1 −α∗0,s1 )+ (β∗s1,s−α∗s1,s) < a1+ (β∗0,s1 −α∗0,s1 ).
So the rules described so far mean that we will not enumerate any further elements into our Solovay test
attempting to capture our ﬁrst initial segment of (p−1)α after stage s1. This is good news, because to do so
would be wasteful – we have already captured one initial segment of (p−1)α, and subsequent enumerations
into the test should be aimed at capturing another initial segment.
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During the construction of our Solovay test we shall place movable markers x0 < y0 < x1 < y1 < . . . on
stages, which are our present guesses as to stages which satisfy the conditions (∗1) and (∗2). We shall have
x0 = 0, since we have assumed that s = 0 satisﬁes (∗1). If y0 ↓ (> 0) then our present guess is that this is a
stage which satisﬁes (∗2), while x1 may be placed on a stage which we believe satisﬁes (∗1) again, and so
on. Suppose that at some stage s, we have y0 = s1 and x1 ↓> y0. Then at stages s′ > x1 we shall enumerate
elements into our Solovay test of the form [a′1, b
′
1], [a
′
2, b
′
2], . . . but now beginning with a
′
1 = (p − 1)αx1 .
Now for the sake of argument, suppose that s1 does not in fact satisfy (∗2) – that it merely appeared to be a
stage satisfying this property, up until some later stage s > x1. At this point it might initially seem that we
have a diﬃculty, because the measure we have enumerated into the sequence [a′1, b
′
1], [a
′
2, b
′
2], . . . should
actually be measure we enumerate into the ﬁrst sequence [a1, b1], [a2, b2], . . . attempting to capture our
ﬁrst initial segment of (p − 1)α. Thus it may seem that we are threatened with having to enumerate certain
measure into our Solovay test twice. The fact that x1 appeared to satisfy (∗2) up until stage s, however,
means that this is not a problem. We have β∗s1,s−1 − α∗s1,s−1 < 0, while β∗s1,s − α∗s1,s ≥ 0. One way to look
at this is to see that, for some r with 0 < r ≤ 1 we have (β∗s1,s−1 − α∗s1,s−1) + r(β∗s − α∗s) = 0, and that
enumerating the measure β∗s1,s − α∗s1,s into our Solovay test actually only requires us to enumerate the new
measure (1 − r)(β∗s − α∗s).
At stage s + 1 of the construction, we shall say that xi requires moving if xi ↓ and β∗xi,s+1 ≤ pα∗xi,s+1. We
say that yi requires moving if yi ↓ and β∗yi,s+1 ≥ α∗yi,s+1. When we enumerate an interval into the Solovay
test, it will always be the case that we associate that element of the Solovay test with one of the markers
xi. If the marker xi is subsequently made undeﬁned (because it or a marker of higher priority requires
moving), then we cannot change the fact that elements of the Solovay test already associated with xi have
been enumerated, but we no longer consider them to be associated with xi, i.e. the list of intervals associated
with xi is initialised.
3.2 Construction
At stage 0, place the marker x0 on 0.
At stage s+ 1, let z be the least number on which a marker is placed and which requires moving, or if there
exists no such number, then leave z undeﬁned. There are three cases to consider.
(1) z ↓= xi for some i. In this case, make xi′ and yi′ undeﬁned for all i′ ≥ i, and go to the next stage.
(2) z ↓= yi for some i. Let r be such that (β∗yi,s − α∗yi,s) + r(β∗s+1 − α∗s+1) = 0. Let [a, b] be the most
recently enumerated interval associated with xi. Enumerate the interval [b, b + (1 − r)(β∗s+1 − α∗s+1)]
into the Solovay test, and associate it with xi. Make yi undeﬁned, and make all xi′ and yi′ undeﬁned
for i′ > i. Go to the next stage.
(3) z ↑. In this case, let w be the greatest number on which a marker is placed. There are then two
subcases.
(a) w = xi for some i. If β∗s+1 ≥ α∗s+1, then let [a, b] be the most recently enumerated interval
associated with xi, or let b = (p − 1)α0 if there exists no such, and enumerate the interval
[b, b + (β∗s+1 − α∗s+1)] into the Solovay test, associating it with xi. If β∗s+1 < α∗s+1 then place the
marker yi on s. In either case, go to the next stage.
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(b) w = yi for some i. In this case, if β∗s+1 > pα
∗
s+1 proceed as follows, and otherwise proceed
immediately to the next stage. Place the marker xi+1 on s. Enumerate the interval
[(p − 1)αs, (p − 1)αs + (β∗s+1 − α∗s+1)]
into the Solovay test, and associate it with xi+1. Go to the next stage.
3.3 Veriﬁcation
Since the total measure enumerated into the Solovay test is bounded by β, it must be ﬁnite. It is also clear
that if a marker is placed at some stage s and never subsequently moved, then s must satisfy (∗1) if the
marker is xi for some i, and s must satisfy (∗2) if the marker is yi for some i.
In order to see that each marker is eventually permanently placed, suppose inductively that x0, y0, . . . , xi, yi
are all correctly placed at some stage yi + 1 (meaning that the marker yi has just been placed correctly).
Let s > yi be the least such that (∗1) holds for s, and consider what happens at stage s + 1. If the marker
xi+1 is already placed on a number < s, then it must be the case that β∗xi+1,s > pα
∗
xi+1,s, otherwise the marker
xi+1 would have been moved prior to stage s + 1. But then, for any s′ > s, β∗xi+1,s′ = β
∗
xi+1,s + β
∗
s,s′ >
p(α∗xi+1,s + α
∗
s,s′) = pα
∗
xi+1,s′ , and so xi+1 satisﬁes (∗1), contradicting the minimality of s. Thus xi+1 cannot
be placed at the start of stage s + 1, and will be placed on s at this stage.
Now suppose that x0, y0, . . . , xi have been placed correctly, let s be the least > xi satisfying (∗2), and
consider what happens at stage s+ 1. If the marker yi is already placed on a number < s, then it must be the
case that β∗yi,s < α
∗
yi,s, otherwise the marker yi moved have been moved prior to stage s + 1. But then, for
any s′ > s, β∗yi,s′ = β
∗
yi,s + β
∗
s,s′ < α
∗
yi,s +α
∗
s,s′ = α
∗
xi,s′ , and so yi satisﬁes (∗2), contradicting the minimality of
s. Thus yi cannot be placed at the start of stage s + 1, and will be placed on s at this stage.
Finally we note that once each xi is correctly placed, an interval to which (p − 1)α belongs is subsequently
enumerated into the Solovay test and associated with xi. This follows because, letting yi take its ﬁnal value,
intervals are enumerated into the test and associated with xi covering the entire interval [(p − 1)αxi , (p −
1)αxi + (β
∗
xi,yi − α∗xi,yi)]. It follows from (9) that (p − 1)α belongs to this interval.
4 Proof of Lemma 2.2
Let X be a Π01 set. Given the existence of eﬀective bijections between N and 2
<ω, it does not matter whether
we consider X as a subset of N or 2<ω, and so for convenience we shall think of X as a set of natural
numbers. We must show that if ΩU(X) is right-c.e. then it cannot be Martin-Löf random. If N − X is ﬁnite
then ΩU(X) is left-c.e., so if it was right-c.e. then it would be computable and so not Martin-Löf random.
We may therefore assume that N − X is inﬁnite. If ΩU(X) is rational then it is clearly not Martin-Löf
random, as required. So we may assume that ΩU(X) is not rational. Let (Xs) be a Π01 approximation to X
and consider the sequence of rationals (ΩU(X)[s]) which converges to ΩU(X). If all but ﬁnitely many terms
of (ΩU(X)[s]) lie to the left of the limit ΩU(X) then ΩU(X) is a left-c.e. real, so if right-c.e. it would be
computable and so not Martin-Löf random. If there are inﬁnitely many terms of (ΩU(X)[s]) on either side
of the limit ΩU(X) then ΩU(X) is not Martin-Löf random by (4), as required. So it remains to consider the
case where all but ﬁnitely many terms of (ΩU(X)[s]) lie to the right of the limit ΩU(X). In this case, since
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ΩU(X) is not rational, there exists an increasing sequence of stages (si) such that ΩU(X)[si+1] < ΩU(X)[si]
for all i. In particular, the terms ΩU(X)[si] form a decreasing sequence which converges to ΩU(X). Deﬁne
ωi = ΩU(X)[si] for each i. It remains to show that in this case ΩU(X) is not Martin-Löf random. We will
do this by constructing a Martin-Löf test (Ui) such that ΩU(X) ∈ Ui for all i.
4.1 Description of the decanter
At each stage si+1 we consider the weight (i.e. measure in the domain of ΩU) which has come in, as well
as the weight which has gone out, since stage si. The weight that has come in consists of the weight added
into ΩU during the stages in (si, si+1], on numbers in Xsi+1 . So the weight that has come in is
∑
2−|σ|, where
the sum is over all σ for which we have seen new computations U(σ) ↓= n for n ∈ Xsi+1 . The weight that
goes out during the same interval, consists of the weight accumulated in ΩU on numbers in Xsi − Xsi+1 , i.e.
ΩU({n})[si] for numbers n that were removed from the Π01 approximation to X during the stages in (si, si+1].
Note that ωi − ωi+1 is exactly the diﬀerence between the weight that has gone out and the weight that has
come in. In particular, the weight that comes in is at most the weight that goes out.
The initial weight ΩU(X)[s0], as well as the weight that comes in at later stages si+1, will be dynamically
split into quanta (namely rational amounts that add up to the total weight in question) and placed onto
various levels of a decanter whose levels extend downward to inﬁnity. Each quantum will be part ofΩU({n})
for some n ∈ N, and in this case we shall say that it has label n. The weight in ΩU({n})[si] will, however, be
split into potentially many diﬀerent quanta, which are distributed at various levels of the decanter at stage
si. The basic rule for the creation of quanta corresponding to additional weight appearing in ΩU , is that
each quantum has a unique label, i.e. it does not correspond to weight which is partly in ΩU({n}) for some
n and partly in ΩU({m}) for some m  n.
At stage s0, for each n ∈ Xs0 such that ΩU({n})[s0] > 0 we place a quantum of weight ΩU({n})[s0] on
the zero level of the decanter, which we call C0. Note that, by standard conventions, for each n such that
ΩU({n})[s0] > 0 we have n < s0, so this is a ﬁnite and eﬀective operation and only ﬁnitely many quanta are
added into C0. Each of the following stages si+1 consists of two operations (to be deﬁned precisely later):
(a) Purge the quanta that have labels in Xsi − Xsi+1 .
(b) Split the weight that has come in into quanta, and distribute these quanta to the various levels of the
decanter.
These two operations will be carried out so as to create the eﬀect of quanta ﬂowing down the levels of the
decanter, possibly with some loss of weight as they travel from each level to the one below. Although this
is the most convenient way to look at the construction, the reader should not forget that, in reality, when a
quantum (or a part of it) ﬂows from one level to the next one, the quantum in the next level corresponds
to diﬀerent weight in ΩU than the quantum at the previous level (and will have a diﬀerent label). In other
words, there is a resistance to quanta ﬂowing from level to level, due to the fact that each ﬂow corresponds
to additional weight in ΩU . This is the crucial observation upon which we will build a Martin-Löf test for
ΩU(X).
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4.2 Construction of the decanter ﬂow
At each stage si+1 we consider the numbers in Xsi − Xsi+1 and purge all the quanta in the decanter which
have their label in Xsi − Xsi+1 . According to the basic rule for the creation of quanta described above, each
quantum has a unique label so there is no ambiguity in this selection. Each of these quanta can be thought
of as a pair (n, δ), where n is the label and δ is the weight of the quantum. To say that a quantum sitting at
level i is purged, simply means that we no longer consider that quantum to sit at level i.
The basic idea now is that we wish to place quanta corresponding to the weight that has come in during the
interval (si, si+1], into various levels of the decanter. We wish to do this in such a way that each quantum
placed can be thought of replacing or ﬂowing from one of the quanta (or part of one of the quanta) just
purged, being placed in the decanter one level below the quantum it ﬂows from. The fact that the weight
coming in is at most the weight going out means that the purged quanta will have suﬃcient weight for us
to be able to carry out such a procedure. Let the weight that has come in be given as a ﬁnite list v1, . . . , vr
where each vi is a pair (ni, δi) such that δi  0 is the new weight that has appeared in ΩU({ni}). Similarly
enumerate the quanta just purged as u1, . . . , ul where each ui is a pair (mi, ρi) which has just been purged
from level i. Deﬁne k1 = 1 and x1 = 0. We deﬁne and place the new quanta in r steps. At step t with
1 ≤ t ≤ r, we are given kt which is the least i such that ui is still available for use in creating new quanta,
as well as xt which is the weight of ukt which has already been used. We create new quanta corresponding
to vt as follows. Redeﬁne ρkt to be ρkt − xt (to account for the weight from this quantum already used).
Let kt+1 be the least such that
∑kt+1
i=kt
ρi ≥ δt and let xt+1 be such that (∑i∈[kt ,kt+1) ρi) + xt+1 = δt. For each
i ∈ [kt, kt+1) place a quantum (nt, ρi) at level Ci+1 and say that this quantum ﬂows from ui. Also place a
quantum (nt, xt+1) at level Ckt+1+1 and say that this quantum ﬂows from ukt+1 .
Once step r is completed and all of the new quanta have been created and placed at stage si+1, there remains
a set of quanta just purged, which were not used in creating new quanta at this stage. More precisely,
consider kr+1 and xr+1 (according to the notation above). Redeﬁne ukr+1 = (mkr+1 , ρkr+1 − xr+1). We consider
the quanta ukr+1 , . . . , ul to be evicted at stage si+1. This concludes the description of the construction.
4.3 Properties of the decanter ﬂow
As we explained above, the construction can be visualised as a dynamic ﬂow of quanta through a decanter
with a countably inﬁnite number of levels Ci, extending downwards and starting from level C0.
Lemma 4.1 (Finiteness of throughput). The number of quanta ever enumerated into each level is ﬁnite.
Proof. We use induction on the levels of the decanter. By construction at each stage only ﬁnitely many
quanta are enumerated into each level. In fact, no enumerations into C0 occur except at stage s0. Inductively
assume that there is a stage u0 after which no enumeration occurs in Ci, i < m. After stage u0 there are only
ﬁnitely many stages where some quantum in Ci, i < m is purged. So there exists a stage u1 > u0 after which
no quantum in Ci, i < m is purged. By construction, this means that no enumeration of quanta into Cm will
occur after stage u1. This concludes the induction step and the proof of the lemma. 
Lemma 4.2 (Weight bound of total throughput). Let k ∈ N. The sum of the weights of all quanta ever
enumerated into Ck, is less than 1/(k + 1).
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Proof. This is trivially true for k = 0, because ΩU < 1. For k = 1 note that every quantum that is
enumerated into C1 at some stage si+1 ﬂows from part of a quantum in C0 of equal weight that has just
been purged during the ﬁrst step of stage si+1. Moreover the weight in ΩU that enters C0 is disjoint from
the weight that enters C1 (i.e. corresponds to diﬀerent convergent computations for U). This means that the
total weight entering C1 can be at most ΩU/2 < 12 . Similarly, the quanta entering C2 ﬂow from quanta of
equal weight in C1, but once again the weight in ΩU enumerated into C2 is disjoint from the weight in ΩU
enumerated into C0 and C1. So if q is the total weight of quanta enumerated into C2, then 3q ≤ ΩU , which
means that q < 1/3. In the same way, for each k, the weight of the quanta enumerated into Ck is less than
1/(k + 1). 
4.4 The Martin-Löf test
The basic idea is that the ith member Ui of the Martin-Löf test will be deﬁned according to the enumeration
of quanta into Ci. The upper bound of Lemma 4.2 will be instrumental in giving an upper bound for the
measure of Ui. The enumeration of Ui can be split into diﬀerent cycles, such that during each cycle there
is no eviction of quanta from C j, j < i. Upon such an eviction we regard the current cycle as injured, we
terminate it (preventing any further enumeration of intervals into Ui this very stage) and then we begin a
new cycle at the next stage. By Lemma 4.1 there will be ﬁnitely many injuries of Ui, and the enumeration
of Ui will have a ﬁnal cycle which runs indeﬁnitely. When counting the measure of reals enumerated into
Ui, of course we also need to consider the reals enumerated into Ui during cycles that are later injured.
Each cycle of Ui has a parameter δi which is the length of the intervals enumerated into Ui in response
to the approximation (ωs). For the k-th cycle of Ui we deﬁne δi = 2−i−k−2. A stage is called i-valid if no
eviction of quanta occurs in C j, j < i.
Construction of the Martin-Löf test. At each i-valid stage s we enumerate the interval (ωs − δi[s], ωs)
into Ui. At each stage which is not i-valid, we say that Ui is injured, we redeﬁne δi := δi/2 and go to the
next stage. This completes the deﬁnition of Ui.
Properties of the Martin-Löf test. Note that the intervals enumerated into Ui are typically overlapping.
Since Ui is injured only ﬁnitely many times, δi reaches a limit, meaning that ΩU(X) belongs to co-ﬁnitely
many of the intervals enumerated into Ui. It remains to obtain an appropriate upper bound for the measure
of Ui. Let Ui(k) consist of the intervals enumerated into Ui during its kth cycle. Then the measure of Ui(k)
is the measure of the initial interval, which is 2−i−k−2, plus the weight of all the quanta evicted during the
stages of the kth cycle. Note that these are all quanta that have passed through Ci, and which cannot be
evicted again at later stages or during later cycles (a quantum can only be evicted once, and once evicted
no quanta ﬂow from it). By Lemma 4.2 the total weight of these evicted quanta over all cycles is bounded
by 1/(i + 1). We can conclude that the weight of Ui is bounded above by:∑
j
2−i− j−2 + 1/(i + 1) < 2/(i + 1).
Deﬁning Vi = U2i+1 we have that (Vi) is a Martin-Löf test such that ∩iVi contains ΩU(X). So ΩU(X) is not
Martin-Löf random, which concludes the proof of Lemma 2.2.
16
References
[ASWZ00] Klaus Ambos-Spies, Klaus Weihrauch, and Xizhong Zheng. Weakly computable real num-
bers. J. Complexity, 16(4):676–690, 2000.
[BDC01] Verónica Becher, Sergio Daicz, and Gregory Chaitin. A highly random number. In C.S.
Calude, M.J. Dinneen, and S. Sburlan, editors, Combinatorics, Computability and Logic, Dis-
crete Mathematics and Theoretical Computer Science, pages 55–68. Springer London, 2001.
[BFGM06] Verónica Becher, Santiago Figueira, Serge Grigorieﬀ, and Joseph S. Miller. Randomness and
halting probabilities. J. Symb. Log., 71(4):1411–1430, 2006.
[BG05] Verónica Becher and Serge Grigorieﬀ. Random reals and possibly inﬁnite computations. Part
I: Randomness in ∅′. J. Symb. Log., 70(3):891–913, 2005.
[BG07] Verónica Becher and Serge Grigorieﬀ. Random reals à la Chaitin with or without preﬁx-
freeness. Theor. Comput. Sci., 385(1-3):193–201, 2007.
[BG09] Verónica Becher and Serge Grigorieﬀ. From index sets to randomness in ∅(n): random reals
and possibly inﬁnite computations. Part II. J. Symb. Log., 74(1):124–156, 2009.
[Cha75] Gregory J. Chaitin. A theory of program size formally identical to information theory. J.
Assoc. Comput. Mach., 22:329–340, 1975.
[Cha76] Gregory J. Chaitin. Algorithmic entropy of sets. Computers&Mathematics with Applications,
2(3-4):233–245, 1976.
[Cha01] Gregory J. Chaitin. Exploring RANDOMNESS. Discrete Mathematics and Theoretical Com-
puter Science. Springer London, 2001.
[Cha04] Gregory J. Chaitin. Algorithmic Information Theory. Cambridge Tracts in Theoretical Com-
puter Science. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
[CHKW01] Christian Calude, Peter Hertling, Bakhadyr Khoussainov, and Yongge Wang. Recursively
enumerable reals and Chaitin Ω numbers. Theoret. Comput. Sci., 255(1-2):125–149, 2001.
[Dem75] Oswald Demuth. On constructive pseudonumbers. Commentationes Mathematicae Universi-
tatis Carolinae, 16:315–331, 1975. In Russian.
[DH10] Rodney G. Downey and Denis Hirshfeldt. Algorithmic Randomness and Complexity. Springer,
2010.
[DHN02] Rodney G. Downey, Denis R. Hirschfeldt, and André Nies. Randomness, computability, and
density. SIAM Journal of Computation, 31:1169–1183, 2002.
[DHNS03] Rodney G. Downey, Denis R. Hirschfeldt, André Nies, and Frank Stephan. Trivial reals. In
Proceedings of the 7th and 8th Asian Logic Conferences, pages 103–131, Singapore, 2003.
Singapore University Press.
[DWZ04] Rodney G. Downey, Guohua Wu, and Xizhong Zheng. Degrees of d.c.e. reals. Math. Log. Q.,
50(4–5):345–350, 2004.
17
[FSW06] Santiago Figueira, Frank Stephan, and Guohua Wu. Randomness and universal machines. J.
Complexity, 22(6):738–751, 2006.
[KS01] Antonín Kucˇera and Theodore Slaman. Randomness and recursive enumerability. SIAM J.
Comput., 31(1):199–211, 2001.
[LV97] Ming Li and Paul Vitányi. An introduction to Kolmogorov complexity and its applications.
Graduate Texts in Computer Science. Springer-Verlag, New York, second edition, 1997.
[Mil17] Joseph S. Miller. On work of Barmpalias and Lewis-Pye: a derivation on the d.c.e. reals. In
Proceedings of the International Symposium on Computability and Complexity (in honour of
Rod Downey’s 60th birthday)., volume 10010 of Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., Berlin, 2017.
Springer.
[ML66] Per Martin-Löf. The deﬁnition of random sequences. Information and Control, 9:602–619,
1966.
[MN06] Joseph S. Miller and André Nies. Randomness and computability: open questions. Bull.
Symbolic Logic, 12(3):390–410, 2006.
[Ng06] Keng-Meng Ng. Some Properties of d.c.e. Reals and their Degrees. M.Sc. thesis, National
University of Singapore, 2006.
[Nie09] André Nies. Computability and Randomness. Oxford University Press, 444 pp., 2009.
[Rai05] Alexander Raichev. Relative randomness and real closed ﬁelds. J. Symbolic Logic, 70(1):319–
330, 2005.
[RZ05] Robert Rettinger and Xizhong Zheng. Solovay reducibility on d-c.e real numbers. In Com-
puting and Combinatorics: 11th Annual International Conference, COCOON 2005 Kunming,
China, August 16–19, 2005 Proceedings, pages 359–368, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2005. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg.
[Sol75] Robert Solovay. Handwritten manuscript related to Chaitin’s work. IBM Thomas J. Watson
Research Center, Yorktown Heights, NY, USA, 215 pages, 1975.
18
